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Abstract—Many significant functionalities of vehicular ad hoc
networks (VANETs) require that nodes have knowledge of the
positions of other vehicles, and notably of those within commu-
nication range. However, adversarial nodes could provide false
position information or disrupt the acquisition of such infor-
mation. Thus, in VANETs, the discovery of neighbor positions
should be performed in a secure manner. In spite of a multitude of
security protocols in the literature, there is no secure discovery
protocol for neighbors positions. We address this problem in
our paper: we design a distributed protocol that relies solely on
information exchange among one-hop neighbors, we analyze its
security properties in presence of one or multiple (independent
or colluding) adversaries, and we evaluate its performance in
a VANET environment using realistic mobility traces. We show
that our protocol can be highly effective in detecting falsified
position information, while maintaining a low rate of false positive
detections.
Index Terms: Vehicular ad hoc networks, neighbor position
discovery, security in vehicular networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
VANETs are envisioned to enable a range of applications,
spanning from enhanced transportation safety and efficiency
to mobile infotainment, while security and privacy enhancing
technologies have been broadly accepted as prerequisites for
the deployment of such systems. A number of on-going
efforts have yielded a multitude of proposed schemes, in-
cluding coordinated efforts such as those of the IEEE 1609
working group, the Car-to-Car Communication Consortium,
the CAMP/VSC-2 project, and the SeVeCom project, which
produced a full-fledged security architecture for vehicle-to-
vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure communications.
Many aspects of security and privacy have already been
addressed (e.g., in [1]–[3]) but no solution has been yet pro-
posed for the secure discovery of the position of other nodes,
in particular those within direct communication range. This
is an important problem because vehicular nodes are location-
aware, and location information is embedded in many VANET
messages to support various applications; transportation safety
and geographical forwarding (or GeoCast) are characteristic
examples, while traffic monitoring and management, as well as
access to location-based services are also closely related. In all
such cases, nodes are required to reliably identify neighboring
nodes and determine their positions. Nonetheless, adversarial
or faulty nodes can falsify or alter such information, resulting
in the disruption of system operations.
Secure discovery of the positions of neighbors cannot be
achieved by any of the solutions in the literature. Secure
localization techniques, which allow a reliable determination
of own location, are a building block but not the solution to the
problem at hand. Simply put, the reason is that an adversary
could advertise a false position in any discovery protocol. The
presence of trusted nodes would make the problem easier
to solve: road-side infrastructure or trustworthy specialized
vehicles could help to securely localize other vehicles. In
such case, techniques in the literature, designed for mobile
ad-hoc networks, could be employed. However, this approach
has severe limitations when applied to vehicular environments:
the presence of road-side infrastructure is envisioned to be
rather sparse and the presence of trustworthy nodes cannot be
guaranteed at all times, whereas position discovery is needed
at any time and location among any two or more vehicles.
To address this problem, we propose our Secure Neighbor
Position Discovery (SNPD) protocol, which enables any node
(i) to discover the position of its neighbors on-demand and
in real-time; and (ii) to detect and discard faulty positions
and, thus, ignore their originators. SNPD therefore allows
any vehicular node to autonomously obtain a set of verified
neighbor positions, leveraging the contributions of its peers
to weed out wrong-doers, without any prior assumption about
their trustworthiness.
In the rest of the paper, we first discuss related work and
introduce the system and adversary model we adopt, then we
describe our SNPD protocol in detail. A security analysis of
SNPD follows, along with a performance evaluation based on
realistic vehicular mobility traces.
II. RELATED WORK
Secure neighbor position discovery for vehicular environ-
ments is, to the best of our knowledge, an open problem.
Nevertheless, it relates to a number of other problems that
have instead been addressed before, as discussed next. We
emphasize that our SNPD protocol is compatible with state-of-
the-art security architectures for vehicular networks, including
those proposed by IEEE 1609.2 [4] and SeVeCom [5].
Securing own location and time information is orthogonal
to our problem, as adversaries can acquire their own locations
in a reliable manner, but then advertise false positions to
their neighbors. Own positioning and time synchronization is
thus a building block for SNPD, as it is for secure vehicular
networking. In vehicular environments, self-localization is
mainly achieved through Global Navigation Satellite Systems,
e.g., GPS, whose security can be provided by cryptographic
and non-cryptographic defense mechanisms [6]; alternatively,
other terrestrial special-purpose infrastructure (beacons) could
be used [7], along with techniques to deal with non-honest
beacons [8]. In the rest of this paper, we assume that devices
can determine securely their own position and time reference.
Secure neighbor discovery (SND), that is, the discovery
of directly reachable nodes (communicating neighbors) or
nodes within a distance (physical neighbors) [9], is only a
step towards the solution we are after. To put it simply, an
adversarial node could be securely discovered as neighbor and
2be indeed a neighbor (within some SND range), but it could
still cheat about its position within the same range. SND is
a subset of the SNPD problem, since it lets a node assess
whether another node is an actual neighbor but it does not
verify the location it claims to be at. Nonetheless, properties
of SND protocols with proven secure solutions [10], [11], are
useful in our context: as an example, signal Time of Flight-
based and other distance measurements between two nodes can
prevent relay attacks (i.e., malicious nodes relaying, stealthily
and verbatim, messages of other correct nodes).
Neighbor position verification was investigated in the con-
text of ad-hoc networks, with solutions relying on dedicated
mobile or hidden base stations [12], or on the availability of
a number of trustworthy devices [13]. Our SNPD protocol,
instead, is a fully distributed solution that does not require
the presence of any particular infrastructure or a-priori trusted
neighbors. Also, unlike previous works, our solution targets
highly mobile environments and it only assumes RF com-
munication; indeed, non-RF communication, e.g., infra-red or
ultra-sound, is unfeasible in VANETs, where non-line-of-sight
conditions are frequent and car-to-car distances often are in the
order of tens or hundreds of meters.
III. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL
We consider a vehicular network whose nodes communicate
over a high-bit-rate data link through an RF interface. We
assume that each node knows its own location with some
maximum error ǫp, and that it shares a common time reference
with the other nodes in the network: both requirements can
be met by equipping vehicles with GPS receivers, already a
major trend in today’s car manufacturing1. Also, nodes can
perform Time of Flight (ToF)-based RF ranging using one
message transmission, with a maximum error equal to ǫr:
as discussed in [13], [14], this is a reasonable assumption,
although it requires modifications to the current off-the-shelf
radio interfaces; ǫp and ǫr are assumed to be equal for all
nodes.
Each node has a unique identity, and carries cryptographic
keys that allow it to authenticate messages from other nodes
in the network. Although there are various ways to enable
authentication, here we only require that message authentica-
tion is done locally and we assume that each node X holds its
own pair of private and public keys, kX and KX , respectively,
as well as a set of one-time use keys {k′X ,K ′X}. X can
encrypt and decrypt data with its key(s) and the public keys
of other nodes; also, it can produce digital signatures with its
private key. We assume that the binding between X and KX
can be validated by any node, as in state-of-the-art vehicular
communication architectures.
Nodes either comply with the SNPD protocol (correct)
or they deviate from it (faulty or adversarial). Adversarial
nodes can advertise arbitrarily erroneous positions in mes-
sages they inject, to mislead other nodes about their position.
1With the help of GPS, user synchronization, fine time granularity and a
relatively precise location information is available. Currently, small-footprint
and low-cost GPS receivers are commercially available, which achieve low
synchronization error and low localization error.
Adversaries are external or internal, depending on whether
they lack or possess the cryptographic keys and credentials
of system nodes, respectively. External adversaries can only
relay or replay messages without changes, or jam the com-
munication. Internal adversaries are more powerful in that
they can fully participate in the protocol execution, forging
arbitrary messages with faked own positions. Recall though
that each adversary can inject messages only according to the
cryptographic keys it possesses; it cannot forge messages on
behalf of other nodes whose keys it does not have. Another
classification of adversaries that is of interest to us is between
independent and colluding adversaries: the former act without
knowledge of other adversaries in the neighborhood, while the
latter, by far the most dangerous, coordinate their actions by
exchanging information.
In this work, we focus primarily on internal adversaries with
standard equipment (e.g., omnidirectional antennas, standard–
compliant wireless cards, etc.). We distinguish them into (i)
knowledgeable, i.e., adversaries that at any point in time know
the exact positions of all their communication neighbors, and
(ii) unknowledgeable, otherwise. In Section V, we will outline
the threats which can be posed by both independent and
colluding adversaries, and discuss possible additional threats
carried out by adversaries using non-standard equipment (e.g.,
directional antennas).
IV. SECURE NEIGHBOR POSITION DISCOVERY PROTOCOL
The SNPD protocol we propose allows any node in the
network to discover and verify the position of its communica-
tion neighbors participating in the protocol message exchange.
SNPD can be initiated in a reactive manner by any node,
which we refer to as the verifier. Our solution is based on
a best-effort, cooperative approach that leverages information
collected by neighboring nodes thanks to the broadcast nature
of the wireless medium. With such information, the verifier
can compute, via ToF-based ranging, distances between pairs
of neighbors, and then perform a sequence of tests that allow
it to classify its communication neighbors as:
• Verified, i.e., nodes the verifier deems to be at the claimed
position;
• Faulty, i.e., nodes the verifier deems to have announced
an incorrect position;
• Unverifiable, i.e., nodes the verifier cannot prove to be
either correct or faulty; due to insufficient information
on these nodes or inconclusive test outcome.
The objective of our SNPD protocol is to be robust to
adversarial nodes, i.e., to correctly identify and reject false
positions and ignore their originators. In other words, it
is necessary to minimize false negative and false positive
outcomes, i.e., adversaries with positions deemed verified and
correct nodes with positions deemed faulty, as well as the
number of unverifiable nodes.
We stress that the SNPD protocol only verifies the position
of those neighbors with which the message exchange takes
place successfully. It therefore disregards nodes for which the
protocol exchange prematurely ends, e.g., due to message loss
or communication neighbors that refuse to take part in the
3protocol. SNPD assumes that the nodes position does not vary
significantly during one protocol execution, which is realistic
if we consider that a complete message exchange takes no
more than a few hundreds of milliseconds. Also, SNPD does
not aim at building a consistent map of verified nodes, as every
verifier autonomously tags its neighbors as verified, faulty or
unverifiable.
Next, we detail the message exchange between the verifier
and its communication neighbors, followed by a description
of the security tests run by the verifier. Table I summarizes
the notations used throughout the protocol description.
A. Message exchange
We denote by tX the time at which a node X starts a broad-
cast transmission and by tXY the time at which a node Y starts
receiving that same transmission; pX is the current position of
X , and NX is the current set of its communication neighbors.
Consider a verifier S that initiates the SNPD protocol. The
message exchange procedure is outlined in Algorithm 1 for S,
and in Algorithm 2 for any of S’s communication neighbors.
The verifier starts the protocol by broadcasting a POLL
whose transmission time tS is stored locally (Alg. 1, lines 2-
3). Such message is anonymous, since (i) it does not contain
the verifier’s identity, (ii) it is transmitted employing a fresh
MAC address, and (iii) it contains a public key K ′S from a one-
time use private/public key pair k′S ,K ′S , taken from a pool of
anonymous keys which do not allow neighbors to map them
onto a specific node. Including a one-time key in the the POLL
also ensures that the message is fresh (i.e., the key acts as a
nonce).
A communication neighbor X ∈ NS that receives the
POLL stores its reception time tSX , and extracts a random
wait interval TX ∈ [0, Tmax] (Alg. 2, lines 2-5). After TX
has elapsed, X broadcasts a REPLY message using a fresh
MAC address, and records the corresponding transmission
time tX (Alg. 2, lines 6-10). The REPLY contains encrypted
information for S, namely the signed neighbor identity, SigX ,
and the POLL reception time: we refer to these data as X’s
commitment, X . The hash hK′
S
, derived from the verifier’s
public key, K ′S , is also included to bind POLL and REPLY
belonging to the same message exchange.
Upon reception of a REPLY message from a communication
neighbor Y , the verifier S stores the reception time tY S
and the commitment Y (Alg. 1, lines 4-6). A different
communication neighbor of S, e.g., X , receives the REPLY
message broadcast by Y , if Y is a communication neighbor
of both S and X , i.e., Y ∈ NS∩NX . In such case, X too stores
the reception time tY X and the commitment Y (Alg. 2, lines
11-13). Note that also REPLY messages are anonymous, hence
a node records all commitments it receives without knowing
their origin.
After a time Tmax +∆ + Tjitter , S broadcasts a REVEAL
message; ∆ accounts for the propagation and contention lag
of REPLY messages scheduled at time Tmax, and Tjitter is a
random time added to thwart jamming efforts on this message.
Through the REVEAL, the verifier S (i) unveils its identity by
including its signature and its public key to decrypt it, and
(ii) proves to be the author of the original POLL. The latter is
achieved by attaching the encrypted hash Ek′
S
{hK′
S
} (Alg. 1,
lines 7-9).
Once the identity of the verifier is known, each neighbor X ,
which received S’s original POLL, unicasts to S an encrypted
and signed REPORT message containing its own position,
the transmission time of its REPLY, and the list of pairs
of reception times and commitments referring to the REPLY
broadcasts it received (Alg. 2, lines 14-17). Commitments are
included ‘as they are’, since only S can decrypt them and
match the identity of the nodes that created the commitments
with the reported reception times.
B. Position verification
Once the message exchange is concluded, S decrypts the
received data and acquires the position of all neighbors that
participated in the protocol, i.e., {pX , ∀X ∈ NS}. S also
knows the transmission time of its POLL and learns the
transmission time of all subsequent REPLY messages, as well
as the corresponding reception times recorded by the recipients
of such broadcasts. Applying a ToF-based technique, S can
thus compute its distance from each communication neighbor,
as well as the distances between pairs of communication
neighbors that happen to share a link. In particular, denoting
by c the speed of light, we define dXY = (tXY − tX) · c, i.e.,
the distance that S computes from the timing information it
collected about the broadcast message sent by X . Similarly,
we define dY X = (tYX − tY ) · c, i.e., the distance that S
computes using the information related to the broadcast by Y .
Exploiting its knowledge, the verifier can run verification tests
to fill the set FS of faulty communication neighbors, the set
VS of verified nodes, and the unverifiable set US .
The first verification is carried through the Direct Sym-
metry (DS) test, detailed in Algorithm 3, where |x| denotes
the modulus of x and ‖pX − pY ‖ is the Euclidean distance
between locations pX and pY . For direct links between the
verifier and each of its communication neighbors, S checks
whether reciprocal ToF-derived distances are consistent (i)
with each other, (ii) with the position advertised by the
neighbor, and (iii) with a proximity range R. The proximity
range R upper bounds the distance at which two nodes can
communicate, or, in other words, corresponds to the maximum
nominal transmission range.
The first check is performed by comparing the distances
dSX and dXS obtained from ranging, which shall not differ by
more than twice the ranging error (Alg. 3, line 4). The second
check verifies that the position advertised by the neighbor is
consistent with such distances, within an error margin equal to
2ǫp+ǫr (Alg. 3, line 5). This check is trivial but fundamental,
since it correlates positions to verified distances: without it,
an attacker could fool the verifier by simply advertising an
arbitrary position along with correct broadcast transmission
and reception timings. Finally, S verifies that dSX is not larger
than R (Alg. 3, line 6), and declares a neighbor as faulty if a
mismatch surfaced in any of these checks2.
2 The latter two checks are performed on both dSX and dXS , however in
Algorithm 3 they are done on dSX only, for clarity of presentation.
4The DS test implies direct verifications that compare trusted
information collected by the verifier against data advertised
by each neighbor. The content of the messages received by
S, however, allows also cross-verifications, i.e., checks on the
information mutually gathered by each pair of communicating
neighbors. Such checks are done in the Cross-Symmetry (CS)
test, in Algorithm 4.
The CS test ignores nodes already declared as faulty by the
DS test (Alg. 4, line 6) and only considers nodes that proved
to be communication neighbors between each other, i.e., for
which ToF-derived mutual distances are available (Alg. 4, line
7). Then, it verifies the symmetry of such distances (Alg. 4,
line 9), their consistency with the positions declared by the
nodes (Alg. 4, line 10), and their feasibility with respect to
the proximity range (Alg. 4, line 11). For each communication
neighbor X , a link counter lX and a mismatch counter mX
are maintained. The former is incremented at every new cross-
verification on X , and records the number of links between
X and other communication neighbors of S (Alg. 4, line 8).
The latter is incremented every time at least one of the cross-
checks on distances and positions fails (Alg. 4, line 12), and
identifies the potential for X being faulty.
Once all neighbor pairs have been processed, a node X
is added to the unverifiable set US if it shares less than
two neighbors with S (Alg. 4, line 17). Indeed, in this case
the information available on the node is considered to be
insufficient to tag the node as verified or faulty (see Sec. V
for more details). Otherwise, if S and X have two or more
common neighbors, X is declared as faulty, unverifiable, or
verified, depending on the percentage of mismatches in the
cross-checks it was involved (Alg. 4, lines 18-22). More
precisely, X is added to FS , US or VS , depending on whether
the ratio of the number of mismatches to the number of checks
is greater than, equal to, or less than a threshold δ.
We point out that the lower the δ, the fewer the failed
cross-checks needed to declare a node as faulty, while the
higher the δ, the higher the probability of false negatives.
In the following, we set δ = 0.5 so that a majority rule is
enforced: the verifier makes a decision on the correctness of a
node by relying on the opinion of the majority of shared com-
munication neighbors. If not enough common neighbors are
available to build a reliable majority, the node is unverifiable.
As shown in the next section, this choice makes our SNPD
protocol robust to attacks in many different situations.
The third verification, the Multilateration (ML) test, is
detailed in Algorithm 5. The ML test searches the verified set
determined through the DS and CS algorithms for suspicious
situations, in which nodes in VS declare a high number of
asymmetric links. When a suspect node is found, the ML test
exploits as anchors other nodes in VS , and multilaterates the
actual position of the node under verification.
The ML test looks for each verified neighbor X of the
initiator S that did not notify a link instead reported by another
party Y (Alg. 5, line 7). When such a node is found, it is added
to a waiting set WS (Alg. 5, line 8) and a curve LX(S, Y ) is
computed. Such curve is the locus of points that can generate
a transmission whose Time Difference of Arrival (TDoA)
at S and Y matches that measured by the two nodes, i.e.,
|tXS − tXY |. It is easy to verify that the curve is a hyperbola,
which is added to the set LX (Alg. 5, line 9).
Once all couples of verified nodes have been checked,
WS is filled with suspect neighbors. For each node X in
WS , S exploits the hyperbolae in LX to multilaterate the
position of X , referred to as pMLX , similarly to what is done
in [13] (Alg. 5, line 14). Note that LX must include at least
two hyperbolae for S to be able to compute the position X
through multilateration, and this implies the presence of at
least two shared neighbors between S and X (Alg. 5, line
13). The resulting position pMLX is then compared against that
advertised by X , pX . If the difference exceeds a given error
margin, neighbor X is moved from the verified set to the faulty
one (Alg. 5, lines 15-17).
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We analyze the security properties of the proposed scheme
in presence of adversarial nodes, whose objective is to make
the verifier believe that the fake positions they advertise are
correct. We consider scenarios of increasing complexity: we
start by discussing the basic workings of the SNPD protocol in
presence of a single adversary and different shared neighbor-
hoods; we then move to the case of multiple adversaries, at first
assuming they act independently and, then, that they cooperate
to perform the attack; finally, we examine the resilience of the
scheme to a number of well-known attacks.
A. Single adversary, no common neighbors
Consider a verifier S that starts the SNPD protocol in
presence of an adversary M , with which it shares no common
neighbor. In order to bring a successful attack, M must tamper
with the data S uses for ranging, so that the resulting distance
confirms its fake advertised position. To this end, M can forge
at its convenience the time information in the messages it
generates. In particular, let p′M be the fake position that M
wants to advertise; we denote by t′SM the fake timing that M
introduces in its REPLY, and by t′M the fake timing inserted
in its REPORT (in addition to p′M ).
The DS test (Alg. 3) run by S on M checks the consistency
between distances, by verifying that |dSM − dMS | ≤ 2ǫr, or:
|(t′SM − tS) · c− (tMS − t
′
M ) · c| ≤ 2ǫr (1)
and that positions are also coherent with the distances, i.e.,
|‖pS − p′M‖ − dSM | ≤ 2ǫp + ǫr, or, equivalently:
|‖pS − p
′
M‖ − (t
′
SM − tS) · c| ≤ 2ǫp + ǫr (2)
Thus, the adversary must forge t′M and t′SM , so that (1)–
(2) still hold after its real position pM is replaced with p′M .
Solving the equation system obtained by setting the error
margin to zero in (1)–(2), we obtain:
t′M = tMS −
‖pS − p
′
M‖
c
= tM +
‖pS − pM‖
c
−
‖pS − p
′
M‖
c (3)
t′SM = tS +
‖pS − p′M‖
c
= tSM −
‖pS − pM‖
c
+
‖pS − p′M‖
c (4)
5Note that p′M is chosen by M , and that M knows tM in (3)
(since this is the actual transmission time of its own REPLY)
and tSM in (4) (since this is the time at which it actually
received the POLL from S). We therefore have a system of two
equations that M can solve, in the two unknowns t′M and t′SM ,
only if it is aware of pS , i.e., it is a knowledgeable adversary.
We stress that, for M to be knowledgeable, two conditions
must hold: first, M must have previously run the SNPD
protocol to discover the identity and position of its neighbors;
second, the verifier’s position must have not changed since
such discovery procedure. Clearly, as M cannot foresee when
S starts the SNPD protocol, such conditions are extremely hard
to fulfill, especially in a highly dynamic environment such as
the vehicular one.
Nevertheless, if M is aware of S’s location, the advertised
position p′M will pass the DS test provided that it is within the
proximity range R, as shown in Fig. 1. Given such potential
weakness, the SNPD protocol marks isolated neighbors as
unverifiable in the CS test, even if they pass the DS test.
B. Single adversary, one common neighbor
We now add to the previous scenario a node X , which is a
correct neighbor, common to S and M . Recall that, in bringing
its attack, M can forge messages with altered information, but
it cannot modify the content of messages sent by other nodes,
since they are all encrypted and signed.
The discussion in Sec. V-A applies again, since the fake
position advertised by M needs to pass the DS test: M must
be aware of S’s current position and must forge t′M and
t′SM according to pS and p′M . However, the presence of the
common neighbor introduces two additional levels of security.
First, the POLL and REPLY messages are anonymous, hence
M does not know if the verifier is S or X upon reception
of such messages. However, if it wants to take part in the
protocol, M is forced to advertise the fake POLL reception
time t′SM in its REPLY message, before receiving the REVEAL
and discovering the verifier’s identity. The only option for M
is then to randomly guess who the verifier is, and properly
change tSM into t′SM , as in (4), and this implies a 0.5
probability of failure in the attack.
Second, the CS test on the pair (M,X) requires that
|dXM − dMX | ≤ 2ǫr and |‖pX − pM‖ − dXM | ≤ 2ǫp + ǫr.
Exactly as before, to pass these checks, M is forced to
advertise the fake timings:
t′M = tM +
‖pX − pM‖
c
−
‖pX − p′M‖
c
(5)
t′XM = tXM −
‖pX − pM‖
c
+
‖pX − p′M‖
c
(6)
If M knows X’s current position pX , it can solve (6) and
announce the forged t′XM in its REPORT to S. However, (5)
introduces a second expression for t′M , whereas M can only
advertise one single t′M . In order to pass both DS and CS
tests, M needs to announce a t′M that satisfies (3) and (5),
which implies:
‖pS − pM‖ − ‖pS − p
′
M‖ = ‖pX − pM‖ − ‖pX − p
′
M‖ (7)
In other words, M is constrained to choose locations with
the same distance increment (or decrement) from S and
X . In (7), pS , pX , and pM are fixed and known, hence
distances between pS and pM , and between pX and pM can be
considered as constant. Since p′M is variable over the plane,
we rewrite (7) as ‖pX − p′M‖ − ‖pS − p′M‖ = k, which is
the equation describing a hyperbola with foci in pS and pX ,
and passing through pM . It follows that only positions on
such hyperbola satisfy the four constraints in (3), (4), (5), and
(6), and p′M must lie on that curve in order to pass all tests.
Examples of this condition are shown in Fig. 2.
Summarizing, the presence of a common neighbor X dras-
tically reduces the vulnerability of the verifier to attacks,
since M is now required (i) to be knowledgeable, (ii) to
correctly guess the verifier’s identity, and (iii) to advertise
a fake position only along a specific curve. However, since
some space for successful attacks remains, the CS test marks
as unverifiable nodes that passed the DS test but share only
one neighbor with the verifier. We also stress that, if M tweaks
the timings so as to pass the DS test and does not care about
the matching with X , it will still be tagged as unverifiable.
C. Single adversary, two or more common neighbors
In the case of two or more common neighbors, we split the
discussion into the two following cases: (i) a generic network
topology and (ii) collinear nodes.
(i) Generic network topology. When a second correct neigh-
bor Y is shared between S and M 3, the discussion in Sec. V-B
can be extended as follows. We noting that, as before, the
adversary M has to be knowledgeable, but a second common
neighbor reduces to 0.33 the probability that M correctly
guesses the verifier’s identity. More importantly, by applying
the same reasoning as in Sec. V-B, M has now to forge
four time values, i.e., t′M , t′SM , t′XM , and t′YM , so that six
equations are satisfied, i.e., (3), (4), (5), (6), and the two
equations corresponding to the cross-check with the second
common neighbor Y 4.
To fulfill the constraints on t′M , now M has to announce a
position p′M that is equally farther from (or closer to) S, X and
Y with respect to its actual location pM . The point satisfying
such condition lies at the intersection of three hyperbolae with
foci in pS and pX , pS and pY , pX and pY , respectively, and
such single point actually corresponds to the real position of
the adversary, pM .
Accordingly, in presence of two common neighbors, the CS
test marks a node with no mismatches as verified. The majority
rule (i.e., δ = 0.5) results instead in the adversary being tagged
as faulty when mismatches are recorded with both common
neighbors. Finally, the adversary is added to the unverifiable
set if it is capable of fooling S and either X or Y , since that
leads to one mismatch over two links checked.
We stress that deceiving S and one of the common neigh-
bors requires, beside the knowledge of their current positions
3Note that we do not make any assumption on the connectivity between X
and Y .
4The latter two equations can be obtained from (5)–(6) by replacing pX ,
tXM and t′XM , respectively, with pY , tY M and t′Y M .
6and a correct guess on the verifier’s identity, also the pinning
of which REPLY comes from which neighbor (i.e., M must
randomly map tXM onto pX and tYM onto pY for the
computations on the hyperbolae to work). Thus, the guess
taken by M in the hope of being marked as unverifiable has a
success probability of 0.165, jointly given by the probability
of guessing the right verifier (0.33) and the probability of
guessing the right mapping (0.5) of REPLY reception times
onto neighbor positions.
When three or more common neighbors are present between
S and M , the chances of a successful attack drop to zero.
Indeed, not only the probability of guessing the right orig-
inators of the different messages shrinks as the size of the
common neighborhood grows, but the majority rule dooms
the adversary to insertion in the faulty set, even when all
random guesses are exact. By extending the above analysis
on the hyperbolae, we observe that, with a threshold δ = 0.5,
when S and M share n ≥ 3 communication neighbors, the
mismatch-to-links ratio is n−1
n
> δ.
A summary of the security of the SNPD protocol, in
presence of a single adversary and in a generic network
topology, is presented in Tab. II, where different rows identify
different behaviors of the neighbor X under verification by S.
The columns represent the number of correct neighbors shared
by S and X . For each combination, we report the set to which
X is assigned by S, possibly with a probability value due to
the adversary’s random guessing on the roles of neighbors.
(ii) Collinear nodes. When the majority of common neigh-
bors is collinear to S and an adversary M , and lies on the same
side as S with respect to pM , a degree of freedom exists for the
attacker. Indeed, M is verified if it announces a fake position
that is collinear with pM and pS , within a distance R from S,
and such that the majority of the common neighbors still lies
on the same side as S with respect to p′M . This case, however,
hardly leads to an advantage for the adversary, since p′M must
remain aligned with the positions of the other nodes, must
respect the ordering with the majority of them, and cannot
exceed S’s proximity range.
D. Multiple independent adversaries
We now consider the presence of multiple uncoordinated
adversaries. It is easy to see that independent attackers damage
each other, by announcing false positions that reciprocally
spoil the time computations discussed in the previous sections.
Cross checks on couples of non-colluding adversaries will
always result in mismatches in the CS test, increasing the
chances that such nodes are tagged as faulty by the initiator.
Where multiple independent attackers can harm the system
is in the verification of correct neighbors. As a matter of
fact, a node is ruled verified if it passes the strict majority
of cross controls it undergoes. A correct node surrounded
by several adversarial neighbors could thus be marked as
faulty (unverifiable), if it shares with the initiator a number
of adversarial nodes greater than (equal to) the number of
correct nodes. An example is provided in Fig. 3. However, it
is to be said that, under the assumption that the percentage of
attackers among all nodes in the network is small, situations
where a correct node shares mostly uncoordinated adversarial
neighbors with the initiator are very unlikely to occur.
E. Multiple colluding adversaries, basic attack
Coordinated attacks carried out by colluding adversaries
are obviously harder to counter than those independently
led by individual adversarial nodes. The SNPD protocol is
resistant to coordinated attacks, unless the presence of collud-
ing adversaries in the neighborhood of the initiator node is
overwhelming.
The goal of adversarial nodes remains that of inducing the
initiator S into trusting the fake positions they announce.
The basic way they can cooperate to that end is by mutu-
ally validating the false information they generate. Indeed,
colluding adversaries can advertise to S reception times (of
reciprocal REPLY messages) forged so that the values derived
through ToF-based ranging confirm the positions they made up
in the CS test. In other words, a perfect cooperation results
in the colluding adversaries’ capability of “moving” all links
among them without being noticed by the initiator. Our SNPD
protocol can counter the basic attack from colluders, as long as
50% plus one of the neighbors in common to the verifier and
an adversary are correct. Indeed, a strict majority of correct
shared neighbors allows the identification of attackers through
the CS test. An example with three colluding attackers is
provided in Fig. 4.
F. Multiple colluding adversaries, hyperbolae-based attack
A more sophisticated version of the basic coordinated attack
can be organized by colluding adversaries as follows. Having
received the POLL message, the attackers not only agree on the
identity of the initiator S, but also pick a common neighbor X
that they share with S: each colluder determines the hyperbola
with foci S, X , and passing through its own actual position,
and announces a fake position on such curve. This allows the
adversaries to announce correct links (i) with the initiator S,
(ii) with the selected neighbor X , and (iii) among themselves.
Node X becomes an involuntary allied in the attack: in order
to work properly, the CS test, based on the majority rule,
needs that more than 50% plus three of the common neighbors
between the initiator and communicating node are correct. The
two additional correct neighbors are required to counter the
effect of X becoming an unintentional colluder during the
cross verification.
G. Multiple colluding adversaries, REPLY-disregard attack
A second variation to the attack presented in Sec. V-E relies
on a coordinated action against REPLY messages received from
correct nodes. As a matter of fact, the CS test can control
the symmetry of links between couples of neighbors only if
ToF-based ranging is performed in both directions. Thus, by
intentionally excluding from their REPORT the commitments
received from correct nodes while including all those received
by colluding nodes, adversaries can selectively avoid cross
symmetry tests with correct nodes, so that no mismatches are
found. We refer to this as a REPLY-disregard attack and stress
7that it requires at least three colluding nodes forming a clique,
or the adversaries would result unverifiable to the initiator,
since they would share less than two (bidirectional) neighbors
with it.
The SNPD protocol is robust to REPLY-disregard attacks,
thanks to the controls run in the ML test. More precisely,
an adversary carrying out a disregard attack together with N
colluders can safely advertise up to N − 1 wrong reception
times from correct nodes, being still tagged as verified by the
majority rule. This means that there must be at least N + 1
correct neighbors, shared by an adversary and the initiator, for
the adversary to be forced to disregard one or more REPLY,
and for two correct shared neighbors to be in the condition
of participating in the ML test and identify the colluder. This
means that 50% plus two of the shared neighbors must be
correct for our SNPD protocol to work properly.
As a final remark on coordinated attacks, we comment
on the significant resources and a strong effort they require
from the colluding adversaries. Colluders have to share out-
of-band links through which they can exchange information
to coordinate the attack, upon reception of the POLL message.
Exploiting such links, they first have to agree on the initiator’s
identity, either by a shared random guess or by employing a
multilateration technique to disclose it. Then, colluders have to
inform each other about the fake positions they will announce,
and about the estimated transmission time of their REPLY
messages: this way, each cooperating adversary is able to
recognize the anonymous REPLY of a colluder node and to
compute a reception time that is consistent with the fake
position advertised by such colluder. Finally, this exchange
of information must occur in a very limited time interval after
the POLL message has been broadcast, so that colluders can
transmit their REPLY messages well before the Tmax deadline.
H. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
Jamming. An adversary M may jam the channel and erase
REPLY or REPORT messages. To successfully perform such an
attack, M should jam the medium continuously for a long
time, since it cannot know when exactly each of the nodes
will transmit its REPLY or REPORT message. Or, M could
erase the REVEAL message, but, again, jamming should cover
the entire Tjitter time; jamming a specific REPLY transmission
is not straightforward either as the REPLY transmission time
is randomly chosen by each node. Overall, there is no easy
point to target; a jammer has to basically jam throughout the
SNPD execution, an action that is possible for any wireless
protocol and orthogonal to our problem.
Clogging. An adversary could induce SNPD traffic in an
attempt to congest the wireless channel, e.g., by initiating
the protocol multiple times in a short period and getting
repeated REPLY and REPORT messages from other nodes.
REPORT messages are large and unicast, and generated in a
short period after the reception of the REVEAL message. They
are thus likely to cause the most damage. However, SNPD
has a way of preventing that: the initiator must unveil its
identity before such messages are transmitted by neighbors.
An exceedingly frequent initiator can be identified and rate-
limited, its excessive REVEAL messages ignored. Conversely,
REPLY messages are small in size, they are broadcast (and
thus require no ACK) and they are spread over the time
interval Tmax. Their damage is somewhat limited, but their
unnecessary transmission is much harder to thwart. Indeed,
REPLY messages should be sent following an anonymous
POLL message; such anonymity is a requirement that is hard
to dismiss, since it is instrumental to keeping adversaries
unknowledgeable. As a general rule, correct nodes can rea-
sonably self-limit their responses if POLLs arrive at excessive
rates. Overall, clogging DoS have only local effect, within the
neighborhood of the adversary, which could anyway resort to
jamming and obtain the same effect.
I. Adversarial use of directional antennas
Assume that adversarial nodes are equipped with directional
antennas and multiple radio interfaces. Then, as a correct
node S starts the SNPD protocol, a knowledgeable adversary
M can send REPLY messages through the different interfaces
at different time instants, so as to fool the communication
neighbors shared by M and S: a correct neighbor X would
record a time t′MX , which is compliant with the fake position,
p′M , announced by M and, thus, can pass the corresponding
cross check in the CS test. If the adversary is able to fool
a sufficient number of neighbors, it succeeds and is tagged
as verified; however, we stress that the adversary needs as
many directional antennas and radio interfaces as the number
of neighbors it wants to fool. Moreover, it must hope that no
two such neighbors are within the beam of the same antenna.
The complexity, cost, and chances of failure make this attack
hardly viable.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To test our SNPD protocol, we selected a real-world road
topology that consists of a 5×5 km2 portion of the urban area
of the city of Zurich [15]. These traces describe the individual
movement of cars through a queue-based model calibrated
on real data: they thus provide a realistic representation of
vehicular mobility at both microscopic and macroscopic levels.
We extracted 3 hours of vehicular mobility, in presence of mild
to heavy traffic density conditions; the average number of cars
in the area at a given time is 1200.
Traces have a time discretization of 1 s. Thus, given a
trace, every second we randomly select 1% of the nodes as
verifiers. For each node, we consider that all devices within the
proximity range R are communication neighbors of the node.
Clearly, the larger the R, the higher the number of neighbors
taking part in the same instance of the SNPD protocol: for
example for R equal to 50 m and 500 m, the average node
degree is 8 and 104.8 and the variance is 5.9 and 71.8,
respectively. Also, we set ǫr to 6.8 m and ǫp to 5 m [14].
Since unknowledgeable adversaries are always tagged as
faulty in the DS test, in the following we present results
considering that all adversaries are always knowledgeable. We
stress that this is a very hard condition to meet in dynamic
networks, hence all results are to be considered as an upper
bound to the success probability of an attack.
8When independent adversaries are considered, we randomly
select a ratio (a varying parameter in our analysis) of the
nodes as attackers. In case of colluders, instead, we randomly
select some nodes as adversaries, and for each we further
randomly identify neighbors who will collude with it so as
to form an attackers group of size σ (or up to the number
of neighbors available). We assume that colluding adversaries
perform hyperbolae-based attacks, which, as previously dis-
cussed, are the hardest to contrast. For every scenario under
study, we statistically quantify the outcome of the verification
test and compare it to the actual behavioral model of the nodes
(namely, correct or adversary).
We first report results in terms of probabilities that the tests
return false positives and false negatives (Figs. 5(a) and 5(c))
as well as of probability that a (correct or adversary) node is
tagged as unverifiable (Figs. 5(b) and 5(d)). The former gauge
the reliability of our scheme, while the latter is a mark of
the protocol accuracy. The plots showing the false positives
and false negatives, when the ratio of adversaries varies and
R=250 m, confirm that our scheme errs on the side of caution:
indeed, as the number of adversaries increases, it is more likely
for a correct node to be mislabeled than for an adversary to
be verified (the latter probability amounting to less than 0.02).
Instead, widening the proximity range with a fixed adversary
ratio, namely 0.05, only plays into the verifier’s hands, thanks
to the greater number of nodes (the majority of which are
correct) that can be tested. As for the probability that a node is
unverifiable, while little sensitivity to the ratio of adversaries
is observed, a small R (hence fewer neighbors) affects the
protocol capability to reach a conclusive verdict on either
correct or adversary nodes. We also estimated that the degree
of freedom that a successful adversary has in setting its fake
position, for R=250 m and a ratio of 0.05 attackers, is such
that, on average, the fake and actual positions of a verified
adversary are collinear and differ by 40 m.
We then fix the adversaries ratio to 0.05 and R to 250 m
and we consider the presence of colluders. Figs. 6(a) and 6(b)
show the excellent performance of our scheme as the colluder
group size σ varies. The impact of colluders on the results
appears to be negligible, mainly thanks to the large number
of neighbors defeating even big groups of colluders.
Finally, we comment on the overhead introduced by SNPD,
in terms of number and size of messages. SNPD generates
at most 2N + 2 messages for one execution initiated by a
verifier with N communication neighbors. This is twice the
cost of an unsecured NPD protocol that would consist of one
poll and N position replies from neighbors. Moreover, SNPD
messages are relatively small in size: with SHA-1 hashing
and ECDSA-160 encryption [16], the length of signatures
is 21 bytes (with coordinates compression). Assuming that
messages include headers with 4-byte source and destination
identifiers and 1-byte message type field, POLL, REPLY,
and REVEAL are all less than 100 bytes in size (to be
precise, 26, 71, and 67 bytes, respectively). The REPORT
length is variable, depending on the number of commitments
it carries: e.g., for 5 commitments, its size is only 295 bytes,
and up to 28 commitments can fit in a single 1500-byte
IP packet. Obviously, the on-demand nature of the protocol
makes it best suited to event-triggered applications, such as
safety and tolling ones. In these scenarios, SNPD induces very
low overhead in the network. The limited number and the
small size of messages make the proactive use of the protocol
feasible, for relatively low rate execution, e.g., once in a few
tens of seconds.
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed a lightweight, distributed scheme for securely
discovering the position of communication neighbors in vehic-
ular ad hoc networks. Our solution does not require the use
of a-priori trustworthy nodes, but it leverages the information
exchange between neighbors. Our analysis showed the scheme
to be very effective in identifying independent as well as
colluding adversaries. Results derived using realistic vehicular
traces confirmed such ability and highlighted the good perfor-
mance of our solution in terms of both false negatives/positives
and uncertain neighbor classifications.
Future work will aim at assessing the performance of the
proposed secure neighbor position discovery protocol when
adversaries have partial or out-of-date knowledge on the other
nodes’ positions, and at adapting our scheme to a high-
frequency proactive utilization.
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9Algorithm 1: Message exchange protocol: verifier node
node S do1
S → ∗ : 〈POLL,K ′S〉2
S : store tS3
when receive REPLY from Y ∈ NS do4
S : store tY S , Y5
end6
after Tmax +∆+ Tjitter do7
S → ∗ : 〈REVEAL, Ek′
S
{hK′
S
},KS, SigS〉8
end9
end10
Algorithm 2: Message exchange protocol: neighbor node
forall X ∈ NS do1
when receive POLL by S do2
X : store tSX3
X : extract TX uniform r.v. ∈ [0, Tmax]4
end5
after TX do6
X : X = EK′
S
{tSX ,KX , SigX}7
X → ∗ : 〈REPLY, X , hK′
S
〉8
X : store tX9
end10
when receive REPLY from Y ∈ NS ∩ NX do11
X : store tY X , Y12
end13
when receive REVEAL from S do14
X : tX = {(tYX , Y ) ∀Y ∈ NS ∩ NX}15
X → S : 〈REPORT, EKS{pX , tX , tX , SigX}〉16
end17
end18
Algorithm 3: Direct Symmetry (DS) test
node S do1
S : FS ← ∅2
forall X ∈ NS do3
if |dSX − dXS | > 2ǫr or4
|‖pS − pX‖ − dSX | > 2ǫp + ǫr or5
dSX > R then6
S : FS ← X7
endif8
end9
end10
Algorithm 4: Cross-Symmetry (CS) test
node S do1
S : US ← ∅, VS ← ∅2
forall X ∈ NS , X /∈ FS do3
S : lX = 0, mX = 04
end5
forall (X,Y ) |X,Y ∈ NS , X,Y /∈ FS , X 6= Y do6
if ∃ dXY , dYX then7
S : lX = lX + 1, lY = lY + 18
if |dXY − dYX | > 2ǫr or9
|‖pX − pY ‖ − dXY | > 2ǫp + ǫr or10
dXY > R then11
S : mX = mX + 1, mY = mY + 112
endif13
end14
end15
forall X ∈ NS , X /∈ FS do16
if lX < 2 then S : US ← X17
else switch mX
lX
do18
case mX
lX
> δ S : FS ← X19
case mX
lX
= δ S : US ← X20
case mX
lX
< δ S : VS ← X21
end22
end23
end24
verifier
M
R
S
adversary fake position
adversary
Fig. 1. If M knows S’s position, it can advertise any fake position, provided
its distance from S is at most equal to R.
M1 adversary
M2
M3S
R
X
correct
verifier
adversary fake position
Fig. 2. M1, M2, and M3 depict different situations in which a single
adversary can be. In the general case (as M1), a knowledgeable adversary that
correctly guessed the verifier’s identity can pass all tests if its fake position
is on a hyperbola with foci in S, X , passing by M1. Particular cases that
determine a degeneration of the hyperbola are: (i) the adversary is equidistant
from S and X (as M2), constraining the fake position on the symmetry axis
of S and X; (ii) the adversary is aligned with S and X (as M3), and not
between them: then, the fake location needs to be on the same line, between
X and a point at distance R from S.
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS
Notation Description
kX (resp. KX ) private (resp. public) key of node X
k′X (resp. K ′X ) private (resp. public) one-time key of node X
tX (resp. t′X ) actual (resp. fake) transmission time of a message by node X
tXY (resp. t′XY ) actual (resp. fake) reception time at node Y of a message sent by node X
pX (resp. p′X ) actual (resp. fake) position of node X
dXY distance between nodes X and Y
ǫp (resp. ǫr) position (resp. ranging) error
R node proximity range
NX current set of communication neighbors of node X
TX random wait interval after reception of POLL at node X
SigX signed identity of node X
X commitment of node X
VX set of verified communication neighbors of node X
UX set of unverifiable communication neighbors of node X
FX set of faulty communication neighbors of node X
Algorithm 5: Multilateration (ML) test
node S do1
S : WS ← ∅2
forall X ∈ VS do3
S : LX ← ∅4
end5
forall (X,Y ) |X,Y ∈ VS , X 6= Y do6
if ∃ tXY and ∄ tYX then7
if X /∈ WS then S : WS ← X8
S : LX ← LX(S, Y )9
end10
end11
forall X ∈ WS do12
if |LX | ≥ 2 then13
S :14
pMLX = argminp
∑
Li,Lj∈LX
‖p− Li ∩ Lj‖
2
if
∥
∥pX − pMLX
∥
∥ > 2ǫp then15
S : FS ← X , VS = VS \X16
end17
end18
end19
end20
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF SECURITY ANALYSIS IN A GENERIC NETWORK TOPOLOGY
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
X
|NS \X| 0 1 2 3+
Correct US US VS VS
Unknowledgeable ad-
versary
FS FS FS FS
Knowledgeable adver-
sary
US US (0.5)
FS (0.5)
US (0.165)
FS (0.835)
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Fig. 3. Clique of four nodes: the verifier S, a correct neighbor X , and
two adversaries (M1, M2). M1 (M2) announces a fake position along a
hyperbola with foci on pS and p′M2 (p′M1 ). However, the latter information isfake, leading to a mismatch in the cross-check on (M1,M2). Also, since each
attacker can “move” at most one link other than that with S, the checks on
(X ,M1) and (X ,M2) fail as well. Thus, M1 and M2 damage each other and
are tagged as faulty. X , although correct, is added to FS , since all neighbors
it shares with S happen to be adversaries.
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(a) Actual positions and links
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(b) Coordinated attack
Fig. 4. Coordinated attack by M1, M2, and M3 against S. All links between
adversaries appear consistent with the false positions they advertise, but links
with correct neighbors X , Y , and Z result in mismatches in the CS test. M1,
sharing with S two colluders but no correct nodes, results as verified. The
same holds for M2, sharing with S two colluders and one correct node. M3
is instead marked as faulty, thanks to the three correct common neighbors.
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Fig. 5. Independent adversaries: probability of false negatives/positives and probability of classifying a neighbor as unverifiable. In (a) and (b), R = 250 m
while the ratio of adversaries varies; in (c) and (d), the ratio of adversaries is 0.05 and the proximity range R varies.
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Fig. 6. Colluding adversaries: probability of false negatives/positives and probability of classifying a neighbor as unverifiable, for ratio of adversaries equal
to 0.05, R = 250 m, and varying group size σ.
